NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 7/2/03.

MURPHY COMMISSION HEARINGS'

BOOKI

Commission Mandate, Membership, Tentation Schadule

#### WITNESSES

19 th

Colby

9:30-12:30

Cline

Porter

(jointly) 1:30-4:00

20th

Hall

9:30-11:00 (perhaps with someone

from ISA and JCS)

dePoix

11:00-12:30

Executive Registry

73 - 5427

2025 M STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DCI/IC-73-10111

MANDATE

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-352, July 13, 1972) established a joint Presidential-Congressional study commission to submit to the Congress and the President findings and recommendations "to provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the Nation's foreign policy."

In describing the duties of the Commission the law states that "the Commission shall study and investigate the organization, methods of operation, and powers of all departments, agencies, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the United States Government participating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy." In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission may make recommendations with respect to the reorganization of the departments and agencies, more effective arrangements between executive branch and Congress, improved procedures among departments and agencies, the abolition of services, activities and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of foreign policy, and "other measures to promote peace, economy, efficiency and improved administration of foreign policy."

The report of the Commission, which is to be submitted to the President and the Congress by June 30, 1975, may include "proposed constitutional amendments, legislation, and administrative action considered appropriate in carrying out its duties." The Commission, in performing its responsibilities, is authorized to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and secure directly information from any executive department or agency.

#### COMMISSION MEMBERS

The Commission is composed of twelve members, four each appointed by the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the President. The members are:

THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. MURPHY - Chairman
Corning Glass International
New York, New York

THE HONORABLE JAMES B. PEARSON - Vice Chairman United States Senate

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Approved For Release 2003/09/02: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000010001-6 Chairman, Center of Strategic & International Studies Georgetown University

MRS. ANNE ARMSTRONG
Counsellor to the President
White House

will probably be obsent

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Tresident

Department of State - Cx-Im Bank

MRS. CHARLES W. ENGLEHARD, JR. Far Hills, New Jersey

MR. AREND D. LUBBERS
President, Grand Valley State College
Allendale, Michigan

MR. FRANK C. P. McGLINN
Executive Vice President
Fidelity Bank
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD Poker Frelimhuysen
House of Representatives

THE HONORABLE MIKE MANSFIELD United States Senate

DR. STANLEY P. WAGNER
President, East Central State College
Ada, Oklahoma

THE HONORABLE CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI House of Representatives

### COMMISSION STAFF

FRANCIS O. WILCOX is the Executive Director of the Commission and FISHER HOWE is the Deputy Executive Director. Former Senator WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., is General Counsel to the Commission. The Commission offices are located at 2025 M Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20506. Telephone (202) 254-9850.

June 1, 1973 COG/FP STAFF 1

FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

2025 M STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

#### TENTATIVE PROGRAM

I. The Commission will look into the impact of change in foreign relations. In particular, it will explore, (1) the changing world environment and the manner in which international affairs are conducted, and (2) the changing role of the United States.

To this end the Staff will commission the preparation by experts of papers and reports to be presented and discussed with the Commission.

II. The Commission will study and investigate the organization, methods of operation and powers of the departments, agencies, independent establishments and instrumentalities of the United States Government participating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy.

To this end, the several departments and agencies, as well as Congressional leaders, will be invited to appear before the Commission to set forth their views. In addition, government officials and other experts will be called upon to discuss the various aspects of relationships among the departments and agencies, and between the Legislative and Executive Branches. In particular, the Commission will seek from these officials a wide range of views relating to the organization for foreign policy, and the problems attendant thereto seen from the perspective of the different institutions.

In anticipation of their appearances before the Commission, and to assist in the exploration of the subject, departments, agencies and experts will be asked to submit reports addressing important questions into which the Commission will want to delve.

A schedule of Commission hearings along the following lines is planned:

Department of State	Sept. 1973	2 days
USIA, AID, ACDA, Peace Corps	Oct. 1973	2 days
Departments of Treasury,	Nov. 1973	2 days
Commerce, & Agriculture		-
Department of Defense	Dec. 1973	2 days
Office of the President	Jan. 1974	2 days
(including NSC, CIEP, OMB)		•
Intelligence Community	Feb. 1974	2 days
Congress	Mar. 1974	2 days
Congressional/Executive Relations	Apr./May 1974	4 days

The Commission will also plan to hold hearings with and receive reports from other departments and agencies concerned with foreign policy; including among others the Departments of Labor, Interior and Justice, AEC, NASA, etc.

During the early stages the Commission-and staff will seek the views of representatives of business, agriculture, labor and other segments of the private sector.

Finally, the Commission, through hearings and informal meetings will look into the following special, complex problems:

- A. Science and Technology in Foreign Affairs
- B. The U.S. Government Relations with International Organizations
- C. Multinational Corporations

III. In order to make suitable recommendations, the Commission will look into the governmental processes and programs in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

To this end it will, under the direction of the staff, arrange for independent research by means principally of small study groups, but in some instances contracted research or other means. Such independent research will be addressed, among others, to the following problems:

- A. Presidential Responsibility and Interagency Coordination: How can the presidential powers in foreign affairs be properly delegated and agency responsibilities most effectively coordinated, especially with respect to better integration of policy planning and decision-making in diplomatic actions and activities?
- B. Public Opinion and Public Accountability: How should public opinion make itself felt on and be dealt with by the Congress and the Executive? As a difficult but important aspect of this problem, how should the matter of confidentiality in foreign policy be handled?
- C. Substantive Problem Areas: How can the Government be organized to deal effectively with some substantive problem areas which touch upon widely divergent governmental interests, such as:
  - population and food resources
  - energy crisis
  - natural resources and the environment
  - seabed and ocean floor

- D. Domestic Interests and Foreign Affairs: How can the Government be organized to deal more effectively with the wide range of problems, including many of the foregoing, but especially economic matters -- trade, monetary, agriculture, resources -- which heavily involve important domestic interests and considerations as well as foreign policy?
- E. <u>Cultural Affairs and Public Information Abroad</u>: How can the cultural affairs and information processes be organized to support more effectively the foreign policy of the United States?
- F. National Security, Military Policy and Arms Limitation: How can the government organization and procedures be arranged most effectively to mesh national security and military affairs with general foreign policy matters? How can arms limitation policies be most effectively handled?
- G. Intelligence and Information Handling: How can the organization be improved for collection of intelligence and information, for reporting, for evaluation and analysis and for dissemination?
- H. Personnel for Foreign Affairs: How can the personnel systems in theforeign affairs effort be improved?
- I. Budget Process and Resource Allocation: How can the budget process, including planning and programming, be improved?
- J. Overseas Establishments: How can the control, coordination and communications systems in the overseas establishments be made more effective and efficient?
- IV. The foregoing discussions with departments and agencies, and most of the work of the independent study groups will occupy the first year. In the second year the Commission will plan to review in greater depth the problems on which it believes recommendations will be made. It will also consider the advisability of holding public hearings.
- V. In its report, the Commission will incorporate proposals for the implementation of its recommendations, and it will seek to obtain the views of departments and agencies, and of government leaders, before submitting its final report.

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Murphy -> Colby letter 15 October 1973

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2025 M STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

131/10-73-1189

October 15, 1973

Mr. William J. Colby Director of Central Intelligence Headquarters, CIA McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear Bill:

As Congressman Zablocki and Dean Wilcox indicated in their recent conversation with you, the Commission is looking forward to meeting with you in November. In preparing for the meeting, the Commission believes it would be especially useful to have a statement setting forth the views of the intelligence community which the members can study in advance and thus make the discussion more profitable. We hope that you will be able to assemble such a statement by the first week in November to permit its distribution to Commission members for the meeting on November 19.

To be most helpful, the statement should address all of the major elements of the national intelligence effort in support of the conduct of foreign policy. For this purpose, it is assumed -- and the Commission would like confirmation or correction of the assumption -- that this effort involves the political, economic, sociological, scientific and military affairs of foreign states, organizations and individuals and that it consists essentially of three principal elements:

- (a) the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information from the following sources:
  - open published materials
  - overt reporting
  - clandestine reporting
  - communications and electronic penetration
  - advanced technological systems
- (b) the preparation through research and analysis, and the dissemination, of studies, reports and estimates
- (c) covert action in support of policy decisions

For each of these elements, the Commission requests an outline of the present organization and procedures particularly in

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respect to coordination among agencies, an identification of the principal obstacles to improved performance, and recommendations for appropriate action.

We hope the statement, in addressing the foregoing matters, will touch upon the following questions in addition to any others which you consider to be of importance:

- (1) Authority. Has the National Security Act of 1947 proved to be sufficiently sound as a basic authority for the Director of Central Intelligence to fulfill his role both with respect to the coordination of intelligence for national security and for the management of the Central Intelligence Agency? In particular,
  - a. what are the practical effects of subordination to the National Security Council rather than directly to the President or a department of the government? Should the system be altered?
  - b. can the responsibilities "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" be adequately delineated from the responsibilities of departments and other agencies "to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence"? (Section 102(d)(3))
  - c. has the responsibility "to protect intelligence sources" proved workable and useful? (Section 102(d)(3))
  - d. is the mandate to perform "such additional services of common concern" (Section 102(d)(4)) adequate to the needs of the intelligence community and the government as a whole? Is the mandate to perform "such other functions and duties" (Section 102(d)(5)) too broad and open-ended?
  - e. has the authority to inspect intelligence of the departments and agencies (Section 102(e)) proved adequate and useful?

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- Requirements. Who are the principal users of intelligence in support of the conduct of foreign policy? What is the present organization and procedure for the preparation and updating of their requirements to guide the intelligence effort? Are such requirements adequate and what recommendations for improvement are suggested? How are requirements handled in crisis situations, and how can that process be improved?
- Performance and Resources. In the fulfillment of these requirements is the most effective and efficient use made of the resources of the intelligence community? What is the basis for arriving at the optimum level of such resources and their distribution within the community in order to give the most effective support? What resource requirements are anticipated for the future?
- (4) Evaluation. How effective is the method of evaluating the performance of the intelligence effort in fulfilling the requirements in support of the conduct of foreign policy? What changes are recommended in this regard?
- (5) Other Intelligence Activities. What is the relationship of intelligence activities in support of military-tactical, counterintelligence, or other purposes to the intelligence activities in support of foreign policy?
- Mhat is the institutional mechanism for coordinating cryptological programs among the several agencies? For managing the advanced technological collection programs? How does this tie in with other government programs using similarly advanced technological systems? Is there a way to economize in this field and perhaps even produce a more effective government-wide effort?
- (7) Reports and Estimates. What is the need of the government for coordinated reports and estimates? How are such reports and estimates now produced?

What means are employed to assure that the analyses are forthright, objective, useful to policy makers at all levels of the government, and as free as possible of institutional biases? Should the research and analytical functions be handled in agencies other than those responsible for collection and operations? For policy formulation and implementation?

- (8) Emerging Needs. How is the mission of the intelligence community changing in the 1970s? What steps are being taken to adapt the intelligence effort to new demands for support in such fields as international trade, energy matters, the environment, and narcotics control?
- (9) Oversight and Accountability. What are the institutional controls through which the Executive Branch and Congress oversee activities of the intelligence community? Are they effective in making the intelligence community realistically responsive to government authorities? Does the public have a right to be better informed about the intelligence business; what improvements should be made in the process of accountability of intelligence activities to the public?
- (40) Controls. In respect to the activities and operations of intelligence which may impinge upon the conduct of foreign policy or in respect to operations designed to support specific policies, what is the system of guidance and control and is it fully adequate? What is done to assure that approving officials are fully aware of the possible consequences of a given action? What improvements in the system are recommended?
- (11) Personnel. Are the personnel procedures for CIA and other agencies in the intelligence community soundly based to recruit and sustain the professional corps necessary for the best intelligence support of the conduct of foreign policy? What steps are being taken throughout the community to mitigate the adverse effects of compartmentalization arising from security requirements in order to achieve greater cross-fertilization of ideas and personnel?

- Budgets. To what extent does the DCI have the authority to determine or otherwise oversee the budget and manpower needs of the various agencies in the intelligence community? Should he have greater authority in this regard? Are the present budget resources of the several components of the intelligence community adequate, excessive or insufficient for their contributions to the intelligence effort in support of the conduct of foreign policy?
- Overseas Establishment. What are the problems of control, coordination, and communications in overseas establishments as they pertain to intelligence? How can these establishments be made more effective and efficient?

The Commission is aware that a comprehensive response to these questions could lead to a most exhaustive study and a very lengthy report. We are hopeful, however, that while giving full attention to the important implications of the questions, you can in your report identify and emphasize the most important elements in our inquiry.

A copy of this letter is going to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, as members of the National Security Council, with the request that they offer whatever comments they can on the foregoing questions to assist the Commission in its study.

The Commission is most appreciative of your personal assistance and thatof other components of the intelligence community in the fulfillment of our tasks.

Cordially yours,

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Robert D. Murphy Chairman

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The President's Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs